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
**OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE 38TH PARALLEL:  
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE STRATEGIC-OPERATIONAL LINKAGE (U)**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction  
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily  
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Departments of Navy or Army.



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## **Abstract of**

### **OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE 38TH PARALLEL: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE STRATEGIC-OPERATIONAL LINKAGE**

Fundamental to the conduct of any war at the operational level is the strategic guidance promulgated by a nation's leadership. This guidance then provides the operational commander with the parameters he uses to issue operational guidance for the theater. Strategic guidance and operational guidance are inextricably linked. One defines the other; both tend to modify the other throughout the war. This linkage, therefore, is dynamic and complex.

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In the operations of the United Nations Forces north of the 38th Parallel during the Korean Conflict, the linkage was essentially static, if not one-sided, since General MacArthur determined what the policy would be at the operational level and, by default, the strategic as well. This allowed General MacArthur to pursue a flawed operational design for the theater with little supervision or modification by the United States' JCS. The responsibility for the subsequent debacle north of the parallel must then be shared between the operational commander, General MacArthur, and the strategic commanders, the JCS.

Inchon marked the peak of the extraordinary career of one of America's most brilliant soldiers. From then on he seemed to march like a Greek hero of old to an unkind and inexorable fate.<sup>1</sup> [General J. Lawton Collins in 1969]

General Collin's observation of General MacArthur's performance after the Inchon landing in Korea was descriptive but omits an important detail: General MacArthur was not alone in this march; General Collins, the Army's Chief of Staff during the Korean Conflict, and the other service chiefs marched with him. Whatever fate awaited General MacArthur and his forces as they crossed the 38th Parallel into North Korea also awaited the Joint Chiefs.

Fundamental to the conduct of any war at the operational level is the strategic guidance promulgated by a nation's leadership. This guidance then provides the operational commander with the parameters he uses to issue operational guidance for the theater. Strategic guidance and operational guidance are inextricably linked. One defines the other; both tend to modify the other throughout the war. This linkage, therefore, is dynamic and complex.

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In the operations of the United Nations Forces north of the 38th Parallel during the Korean Conflict, the linkage was essentially static, if not one-sided, since General

MacArthur determined what the policy would be at the operational level and, by default, the strategic as well. This allowed General MacArthur to pursue a flawed operational design for the theater with little supervision or modification by the United States' JCS. The responsibility for the subsequent debacle north of the parallel must then be shared between the operational commander, General MacArthur, and the strategic commanders, the JCS.

Any operational commander is responsible for formulating the operational design for the theater. In constructing this design, the commander at the operational level of war must address its principal elements of guidance, desired end state, objective, identification of the enemy critical factors, the axis of operations, and the operational idea or scheme.<sup>2</sup> These elements form a bridge between the strategic and tactical levels of war by translating the national policy into executable orders. They also provide a useful methodology by which to analyze General MacArthur's operations and the JCS' questionable supervision that resulted in defeat north of the 38th Parallel.

**GUIDANCE.** Of all the elements of operational design, this is the most important for it is the foundation of the entire war.

. . . In general, guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary goals. It must define what constitutes "victory," and it must determine what forces and assets should be used, time-space factors, restraints, and constraints. . . .<sup>3</sup>

Before crossing into North Korea, General MacArthur received specific guidance from the JCS dated 27 September 1950 addressing what his goal was and establishing very specific restraints and constraints.

Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in

Korea, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the north-east provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of the 38th Parallel will not include Air or Naval action against Manchuria or against USSR territory. . . .

Circumstances obtaining at the time will determine the character of and necessity for occupation of North Korea. Your plans for such occupation will be forwarded for approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You will also submit your plan for future operations north of the 38th Parallel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.<sup>4</sup>

This JCS directive was remarkable in that it stated specifically what General MacArthur's military objective was, constrained his operation contingent on Soviet or Chinese actual intervention or threat to intervene, restrained his operation from crossing the Manchurian or USSR borders, restricted him from employing non-Korean forces along the border provinces, and required him to forward his plans for approval. These instructions bespoke a JCS very concerned about keeping this conflict limited by proscribing the freedom of the theater commander. Contrast this with the JCS guidance given to General Eisenhower for the liberation of Europe:

You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.<sup>5</sup>

There is a marked difference. From the JCS' perspective, at least, any operations in North Korea were to be decidedly limited. Korea was not to be a general or total war but a limited, constrained conflict.

However, this JCS guidance proscribing a limited war was to become decidedly less specific with the United Nations' resolution passed on 7 October 1950 calling for:

- (a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;
- (b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the

auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea. . . .

(d) United Nations force should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objective specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above. . . .<sup>6</sup>

Whereas the JCS' guidance attempted to establish the framework for a limited conflict within the theater, the United Nations' resolution essentially relaxed the constraints and restraints by calling for "all appropriate steps". Yet, the JCS could not forget that this was an United Nations operation as defined by the 7 July 1950 Security Council resolution.<sup>7</sup> Even though the United States supplied the bulk of forces and was requested to designate the effort's commander,<sup>8</sup> both the forces and General MacArthur operated as United Nations entities. With respect to clear, unambiguous guidance, then, the linkage between the strategic and operational levels began to strain.

While the JCS provided specific guidance to the operational commander, additional strategic guidance was now extant with the 7 October resolution. Even though the JCS did not include the mission of unifying Korea when it provided an informational copy of the UN resolution to General MacArthur,<sup>9</sup> it also did not resolve the conflict in strategic guidance. By not doing so, any reconciliation would be the responsibility of the operational commander by default. In effect, the operational commander--not the strategic leaders--would now determine the type war prosecuted. This abdication of strategic leadership by the JCS positioned the country precariously on the escalatory precipice.

**DESIRED END STATE.** The operational design element of desired end state concerns

. . . both [the] political and military conditions after the military strategic objective(s) were attained. . . . Operational planners must always consider [the] desired end state in planning a campaign (or strategic operation) . . . designed to end the hostilities. . . .<sup>10</sup>

Achieving this desired end state necessitated an evaluation of the country's "Theories of Victory"--the assessment by the national leadership of their assumptions concerning the usefulness of military operations in the achievement of their political objectives.<sup>11</sup> From the strategic guidance contained in the United Nations' resolution, the political objective for the United Nations' theory of victory was a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. How military operations would contribute to this political objective was not specifically stated by either the United Nations or the American JCS. This necessary military condition for the realization of the political objective would have to apply not only to the Korean Peninsula but also to the entire region of Northeast Asia. Consequently, the military forces of Communist China and the USSR would have to be addressed.

The JCS guidance only addressed the forces of China and the USSR as a constraint to General MacArthur's operations with the inherent assumption being, if they intervene, his operations had to stop at the 38th Parallel. It did, however, specify an operational objective--the destruction of the North Korean Army. In contrast, the United Nations' resolution called for stability throughout Korea which, again, involved an assumption concerning the Chinese and Soviet military forces. However, this assumption by the United Nations allowed General MacArthur to conduct direct combat operations against these forces to effect the military stability or balance of power in the region.

Neither the American JCS nor the United Nations, therefore, clearly and unambiguously defined a desired end state by considering those assumptions necessary for military operations to yield the desired political objective. General MacArthur, as the operational commander in the field, had the task (by default) of developing his own theory of victory then desired end state, both of which possibly quite different from what the strategic leadership might of had in mind. Again, with respect to this element of operational design, the linkage between the strategic and operational levels was strained if not decoupled.

**OBJECTIVE.** The operational objectives, both military and political, should result from the consideration of the theory of victory. These objectives become intermediate stepping stones by which the theory of victory is realized. For the operational commander, this generally entails

. . . the destruction, surrender, or withdrawal of enemy forces. . . . and [the] determin[ation] in advance a single ultimate or end objective to be accomplished, and . . . a series of intermediate objectives. . . .<sup>12</sup>

Again, there was confusion as to what the ultimate objective was. The United Nations resolution specifically identified an ultimate objective--stability throughout Korea--whereas the JCS really identified an intermediate objective--the destruction of the North Korean Army. The JCS' assigned objective was readily identified as intermediate in that the destruction of the North Korean Army was a necessary condition to accomplish the ultimate objective but not a sufficient one. The JCS' selection of a specific military objective begged the question as to what its ultimate, or strategic, objective actually was?

While not stated directly, the JCS' 27 September guidance statement identified its strategic objective by the imposition of constraints on General MacArthur's campaign. There was one set of strategic and operational objectives stated but also one set implied: first, if the Chinese and Soviets do not intervene, destroy the North Korean Army (operational) and, by consequence, occupy North Korea (strategic); and second, if the Chinese or Soviets intervene, remain at the 38th Parallel (operational) and reestablish the status quo ante (strategic).

The convolution of the respective guidance gave General MacArthur the strategic objective of a stable, unified Korea through the destruction of the North Korean Army, regardless of Chinese or Soviet actions. This was certainly not the intent of the JCS.

**IDENTIFICATION OF THE ENEMY'S CRITICAL FACTORS.** This element is fundamental to the eventual success of any operational design. Central to identifying the enemy's critical factors is determining his center of gravity, or COG. A Center of Gravity is properly defined as

. . . that aspect of the enemy's overall capability that, if attacked and neutralized or destroyed, will lead either to the enemy's inevitable defeat or force him to abandon his aims. . . .<sup>13</sup>

Moreover, a center of gravity exists at all three levels of war. The importance of the proper identification of the enemy's COG cannot be over-emphasized as

The determination of the wrong center of gravity will invariably result in a flawed operational scheme, and will therefore most likely lead to a failure of the entire military enterprise. . . .<sup>14</sup>

Since General MacArthur's operational scheme north of the 38th Parallel resulted in defeat and subsequent retreat, he must have either misidentified or ignored the proper enemy center of gravity. While not specifically identified, his operational scheme sheds

light on what he considered the North Korean operational center of gravity--its army--by his plans to attack it.

Initially favoring a double amphibious envelopment, landing at both Wonsan on the east coast and Chinampo on the west, combined with an attack by the Eighth Army, all to break the Pusan Perimeter, General MacArthur was to settle on a single envelopment due to the availability of adequate forces.<sup>15</sup> After the Inchon landing, his plan had the U.S. Eighth Army as the main effort advancing along the western coast of North Korea orienting on the capital of Pyongyang while the Republic of Korea I Corps advanced along the eastern coast toward Wonsan. Concurrently, the U.S. X Corps was to conduct an amphibious landing into the port of Wonsan and then drive west along the major west-east thoroughfare, the Pyongyang-Wonsan road, to link up with the Eighth Army.<sup>16</sup> By employing the X Corps in this manner, General MacArthur intended to encircle the North Korean capital.<sup>17</sup> This envelopment aimed at trapping then destroying the remnants of the North Korean Army.

While this scheme targeted the North Korean operational center of gravity, it appears that little concern was given the North Korean strategic center of gravity--its relationship with Communist China. Prior to initiating operations in North Korea, three events should have made the JCS reconsider this strategic center: first, the public warnings by Chou En-lai on 30 September that China would defend her neighbor; second, the message passed by the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to the Indian ambassador, K. M. Panikkar, on 3 October promising Chinese resistance if the United States entered North Korea; and third, the CIA's reports that since April, China had been

shifting northward nearly half a million soldiers.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, on 12 October, the CIA proceeded to undercut its own reports by discounting any Chinese assistance to the North Korean Army beyond covert aid.<sup>19</sup> While the JCS appeared initially through its 27 September guidance to recognize not only the existence of the North Korean strategic center of gravity but also its probable link to the operational COG, this awareness was clouded if not gone by early October. The JCS--by itself--had essentially decoupled the strategic center of gravity from the operational COG.

General MacArthur also discounted the North Korean strategic center of gravity. When asked specifically by President Truman during the Wake Island Conference on 15 October as to the chances of Chinese or Soviet intervention, General MacArthur replied, "Very little."<sup>20</sup> What was even more surprising was his acknowledgement to President Truman of the size and probable intention of the Chinese forces in Manchuria.

. . . The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these, probably not more than 100/125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50/60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no air force. . . . if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter. . . .<sup>21</sup>

This summary dismissal by General MacArthur of the possible size of a Chinese intervention initially was understandable--approximately 14% of his total--when compared to his ground forces numbering 423,313;<sup>22</sup> but the percentages take on an ominous nature when viewed as proportions of both the South Korean and American ground force contingents--approximately 27% and 34% respectively.<sup>23</sup> Viewed differently, General MacArthur barely had a 3:1 advantage (the absolute minimum to conduct offensive operations) if the Chinese intervened, not including any remaining North Korean troops.

Tragically, these percentages only increased while his slim offensive advantage dissipated.

Here General MacArthur, as with the JCS, essentially discounted the strategic center of gravity as having little impact on operations north of the 38th Parallel. Unfortunately, both General MacArthur and the JCS failed to realize that the destruction of an operational center of gravity may have significant impact on a strategic COG. The tactical, operational, and strategic centers of gravity were not independent entities but dynamically dependent. In targeting one, the ramifications to the others must always be considered. By allowing the focus of the campaign to be the operational center of gravity, the JCS and General MacArthur must share equal blame in the disintegration of the strategic/operational linkage, thus also responsible for setting up the command for a terrible surprise.

**DIRECTION/AXIS.** The fifth element of operational design is the determination of the direction or axis of operations. The direction is used

. . . to unify and synchronize combat actions of diverse combat arms in the accomplishment of the assigned physical objective(s). . . . [and] . . . the task of the operational commander and his staff [is] to determine several operational directions, thereby complicating planning for the opponent by making it more difficult to determine from where the next blow will come.<sup>24</sup>

The physical terrain of the Korean peninsula presented formidable challenges to any operational commander in unifying and synchronizing his combat forces. From the high mass of mountains along the Manchurian and Soviet borders to the Taebaek Mountains running the length of the eastern coast, Korea was not well suited to a highly mechanized force as was General MacArthur's.<sup>25</sup> Operating on this terrain, any force would be compartmentalized, thereby making synchronization between departments

difficult if not impossible. Consequently, it became difficult to confuse the enemy as to the possible avenues of approach as they were finite--the western corridor along the peninsula's Yellow Sea coast, the central corridor along the Imjin River valley, and the eastern corridor along the Sea of Japan coast. General MacArthur's belief in amphibious operations was a technique whereby he could confuse the enemy and free himself from entire sections of the terrain; yet, upon landing, he once again had to operate within the terrain's constrictions.

The high mountains along the Manchurian and Soviet borders, however, presented a unique problem to General MacArthur's operations of such magnitude that the entire direction of the campaign should have been altered. Upon advancing north by crossing the Pyongyang to Wonsan road that connects the western and eastern corridors, there were no opportunities for easy cross-compartment communications. Consequently, General MacArthur's operations of Eighth Army in the west and the I ROK and X US Corps in the east were independent with no chance for mutual support. General MacArthur recognized this problem and solved it by establishing two separate commands coordinated from Japan, his headquarters.<sup>26</sup> This split was not missed by the JCS, but for them:

It was not within the province of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to challenge MacArthur's system of command for the attack across the 38th Parallel; such matters are the prerogative of a commander. . . .<sup>27</sup>

But what were the JCS but strategic commanders ultimately responsible for the decisions of one of their field commanders? Here, the strategic-operational link was nonexistent as the prerogative of the field commander was held to be sacrosanct. Unfortunately, General MacArthur's exercise of this unsupervised prerogative presented a unique

opportunity. This fact could not have been missed by either the North Koreans or the Chinese.

**OPERATIONAL SCHEME.** The last element of any operational design is the commander's actual concept or scheme for the campaign he is to undertake. Specifically,

. . . To be successful, the operational idea must portray the broad vision of what the operational commander intends to do and how he intends to do it. . . . It should demonstrate certain boldness in the execution of forthcoming action, and it should make explicitly clear that the focus is on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's center of gravity. . . .<sup>28</sup>

Once dissuaded from the amphibious double envelopment due to force restrictions and the success of Inchon, General MacArthur settled upon a single envelopment through Wonsan. This initial plan then went through two changes as he reestablished the non-Korean forces restraining line progressively northward. A crucial element in these subsequent changes was the JCS' reaction to the new restraining lines and its ongoing preparations for force redeployments to Europe.

Initial Plan. General MacArthur's plan (See Map Appendix A) launched the Eighth Army north--the main effort--along the western and central corridors with two corps abreast--the I US Corps in the west and the II ROK Corps in the center--orienting on Pyongyang. The IX US Corps, the Eighth Army's third corps, was initially left in South Korea. Concurrently, the I ROK Corps was to advance in the eastern corridor toward Wonsan while the X US Corps was to conduct an amphibious landing into Wonsan. This would allow the X Corps via the Wonsan-to-Pyongyang road to cut off and destroy the remaining elements of the North Korean Army.<sup>29</sup> General MacArthur arbitrarily set his own restraining line to cut across the waist of the peninsula from approximately Chongju-to-Hungnam.<sup>30</sup> (See Map Appendix A, Line A) The JCS was to

approve on 29 September this line as part of the overall scheme that General MacArthur forwarded for approval the day before.<sup>31</sup> This scheme appeared to satisfy the JCS' 27 September guidance.

The execution of this plan ran into immediate problems caused chiefly by three reasons. First, the attack was scheduled to commence on 19 October nearly a month after the Inchon landing. This was contrary to the contemporary doctrine of keeping direct pressure on a retreating enemy so as to hasten his destruction. Second, with the landing of the X Corps at Inchon and the Eighth Army's breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and attack northwest to Seoul, each occupied the position best suited for the other in continuing any operations north of the 38th Parallel. X Corps was to the north of Eighth Army astride the corridor that the Army would use to attack north. Third, with General MacArthur's decision to use the X Corps in an amphibious assault to Wonsan, it had to out-load from Inchon thereby causing a logistics nightmare. Inchon was the same port that Eighth Army was using to supply its forces. With the priority changed to the out-load of X Corps, Eighth Army had to rely on air drops for supplies.<sup>32</sup>

The operational timing of the design also unraveled almost immediately as the ROK I Corps, moving through the eastern corridor, captured Wonsan on 11 October and Hungnam and Hamhung, both north of Wonsan, on the 17th while the Eighth Army's initial plan was to cross the Parallel on the 19th. This date was finally advanced the date to the 9th. To further disrupt the scheme's timing, Pyongyang fell to Eighth Army units on the 20th, the same day that the X Corps' amphibious assault was scheduled. As it

was, the 1st Marine Division, an element of the X Corps, could not come ashore at Wonsan until the 26th due to the countermine operations in the harbor.<sup>33</sup> General MacArthur's intention to trap and destroy the remnants of the North Korean Army was not realized; his operational scheme had failed.

Change 1. With his planned trap of the North Korean Army in shambles, General MacArthur announced a new restraining line running from Sonchon in the west to Songjin in the east. (See Map Appendix A, Line B) Not only was this new line farther north and longer--it cut the peninsula about thirty miles north of the old line and was about twice as long--but the terrain it encompassed was certainly less defendable; yet, amazingly there was no comment from the JCS.<sup>34</sup> Even General Collins noted that

. . . This was the first, but not the last, stretching of MacArthur's orders beyond JCS instructions. If the Chiefs noted this--and I have no recollection that we did--we offered no objection.<sup>35</sup>

The operational objective of destroying the North Korean Army had now assumed a strategic significance regardless of the JCS' initial guidance of 27 September. The strategic goals of the entire theater were of secondary importance to this operational objective. The culmination of the operation was beyond calculated risk; it was gamble.

Change 2. On 24 October, General MacArthur lifted the Sonchon-to-Songjin restraining line and told his subordinate commanders to secure all of North Korea with any or all of their forces. The JCS finally recognized this new restraining line of the Yalu River (See Map Appendix A, Line C) as a clear violation of its 27 September guidance and requested a reason from General MacArthur.<sup>36</sup> His reply should have been enough to spur the JCS into action:

The instructions contained in my [message to UNC commanders] were a matter of military necessity. . . . There is no conflict that I can see with the directive . . . dated 27 September, which merely enunciated the provision as a matter of policy . . .

I am fully cognizant of the basic purpose and intent of your directive and every possible precaution is being taken . . .<sup>37</sup>

Again, according to General Collins, "The JCS at least tacitly accepted MacArthur's defense of his order and made no move to countermand it."<sup>38</sup> Consequently, General MacArthur was not alone in allowing his forces to unknowingly spring the trap that the Chinese forces had prepared in the high mountains of North Korea<sup>39</sup> as the JCS also acquiesced. Once sprung, the widely separated positions of the Eighth Army and the X Corps collapsed causing a retreat back down the peninsula below the 38th Parallel. General MacArthur's fixation on destroying the North Korean Army at all costs--with the JCS' tacit approval--resulted in a debacle of strategic importance.

Force Redeployments. Unfortunately, the JCS' involvement in General MacArthur's implementation of his operational scheme did not end with its lack of supervision of the operation. It was ongoing as the JCS planned to strip forces from the Far East Command. This intention was evident during the Wake Island conference when General Bradley asked General MacArthur about the release of one division for assignment to the newly created NATO organization in Europe.<sup>40</sup> With the 8 September 1950 committal by President Truman of four to six divisions to reinforce NATO, a search was on to find available troops.<sup>41</sup> General MacArthur's Far East Command seemed to be a logical source.

This commitment to NATO certainly shaped the strategic guidance that the JCS forwarded to General MacArthur on 27 September. Cognizant of the nation's commitments to other parts of the world, the JCS' guidance was meant to restrict General

MacArthur to a limited war in Korea. These strategic concerns were to restrain operational matters; the link was intended to be strong, directive. Yet, with the stunning success of the Inchon landing and the apparently successful operations north of the 38th Parallel, the JCS' lack of supervision weakened the link transforming it from directive in nature to consultative. With their apparent knowledge, unfortunately, this operation changed from a calculated risk to a gamble with a debacle ensuing. The retreat down the peninsula destroyed not only the operational commander's scheme but also the JCS' considered redeployment schedules. The problem became simply a search for victory from defeat.


**CONCLUSION.** The six elements of operational design--guidance, desired end state, objective, identification of enemy critical factors, direction or axis, and the operational scheme--provide a useful analysis framework. Applied to General MacArthur's operations north of the 38th Parallel, the causes for his subsequent defeat are readily identified, the foremost being what constituted operational guidance given the strategic guidance.

Always linked, both tend to modify one another dynamically. In the case of General MacArthur, his operational guidance assumed strategic significance with little to no supervision or modification by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS tended to defer to the field commander's judgement<sup>42</sup> almost assuming that the result would satisfy their concerns. General MacArthur's did not. The JCS crafted its guidance in specific terms for a considered reason--restrict General MacArthur's operations and keep the conflict decidedly limited. He would purposely not have the leeway granted General Eisenhower

to defeat German forces on the Continent. Consequently, the JCS issued detailed guidance to craft a strategic goal of a limited war; they intended a close, directive link with their operational commander. Unfortunately, the directive link became consultative in practice with the operational commander risking a wider war through his own interpretation. The result was that the JCS' operational commander pursued a flawed operational design without strategic oversight or supervision.

While General MacArthur's may have been that Greek hero of antiquity marching to an unkind fate, the JCS were certainly there as shield bearers. The responsibility for the subsequent debacle north of the parallel, therefore, must be shared not only by the operational commander, General MacArthur, but the strategic commanders, the JCS, as well.

APPENDIX A<sup>43</sup>



## NOTES

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15. Collins, 155-157.
16. Scheme summarized from Department of History, USMA, Confrontation in Asia: The Korean War (West Point: United States Military Academy Undated), 25-27.
17. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History 1961), 611.
18. These events summarized from James, 489-491.
19. Ibid., 491.
20. Collins, 153.

21. Ibid.
22. Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950 - July 1951 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History 1990), 23. Percentage based on 60,000 Chinese and 423,313 Allied troops.
23. Percentages based on 223,950 South Korean, 178,464 American and 60,000 Chinese troops. South Korean and American troop figures from Mossman, 23.
24. Vego, 7.
25. Mossman, 5.
26. Appleman, 611.
27. Collins, 161.
28. Vego, 7.
29. See Note #13 above.
30. James, 493.
31. Collins, 157-158.
32. Summarized from USMA History Dept., 27-28.
33. Results of initial plan summarized from James, 492-495.
34. James, 493.
35. Collins, 177.
36. Summarized from James, 499.
37. James, 499.
38. Collins, 180.
39. USMA History Dept., 30.
40. Collins, 154.
41. USMA History Dept., 25.
42. James, 499-500.

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